Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts

Cultural Anthropology and Philosophy while waiting in line at Starbucks

I was in New York City a week ago. Before I went into work, I was waiting in line to order a coffee at Starbucks. Finally arriving at the front of the line I walk up to the register, but a man with a Middle Eastern accent jumps in front of everyone and shoves a hundred dollar bill in the cashier's face. He demands three espressos. Without going into detail about the confused and frustrated look on my face, while I walked to work I compared Middle Eastern and American culture. I was curious about their cultural approaches when it comes to reserving a table at a restaurant and ordering what you want at a market (in this case, a coffee shop).

Edward Hall in his book the Hidden Dimension observes we don't notice our own cultural norms until we come up against another culture with a different set of tacit rules. Having come up against a Middle Eastern interaction, I asked myself, what does the line represent in American culture? I think the answer to this question goes back to 1776 - standing in line means that everyone is created equal. It's a utilitarian solution to ensure everyone's needs and wants are of equal value.

The Middle Eastern man trying to order his espressos must have felt just as frustrated as me, trying to figure out why he couldn't order his espresso. My Iranian father occasionally expressed these frustrations at restaurants when he wasn't served immediately. Growing up, I had a difficult time understanding why he wouldn't make a reservation ahead of time. Instead, he would make a scene after hearing there's a two hour wait time when he arrived at the restaurant. Now that I'm 3000 miles away from where I grew up, Los Angeles, I feel like I have a new understanding for this part of Middle Eastern and American culture.

What do other people think, what does the line represent?

"Art buys people"

I originally made the statement out of jest, but now that I think about it more, I find myself going down an intriguing and endless rabbit hole. The rabbit hole begins to feel much colder and darker as we fall further into it... so bare with me...

Art buys people - what does it mean and is it possible? It's just three words, but the word that bothers me the most, and I feel requires the most explication is 'buys.' 'Buys' implies an exchange of ownership. The usual way to buy something is done through money, or if we go way back in time, bartering is another way to exchange ownership of something. Since 'art' doesn't seem to be paying for people using money, there must be some sort of bartering going on between art and another entity for ownership of people. When an exchange of ownership occurs, it's usually an exchange between two or more parties. To keep it simple, let's stick with an exchange between two parties. This means art is exchanging something with another party for ownership of people. Or in other words, art is bartering for people.

This now leads me to four questions. First, what is being exchanged? Second, who or what is art bartering with in order to own people? Third, where is the exchange occurring? And fourth, how long does art own people? I think these four questions are too tightly coupled to address one without answering the others. So I'll try my best to provide uncoupled answers - consider it a rough draft. Answering these questions will show that art can indeed buy people, in some sense of the phrase.

If we look at the spaces where art exists: museums, sidewalks, our bodies, the internet... etc. I think they all fall on a spectrum between purely private and purely public spaces. I think the length of time one party can own something is dependent on where it's located. For example, graffiti on a sidewalk may last for a few hours to years, at least until someone deems it inappropriate and paints it over. A museum owns a piece from months to decades, and then it's traded, auctioned, or placed in storage. A tattoo can be owned for a lifetime. From these examples, I'm inferring that ownership is temporally based on the space it's located in.

So far, I've shown ownership is temporal and dependent on the space it's in. Next, who or what is art bartering with in order to own people? In order to answer this question, we have to look at the different parties that exist in a space. I'm also assuming that not all people can be owned by art. This means, each spaces contains art, people, the unownable people, and the space itself. The simplest answer seems to be that art is bartering with the unownables in order to own people. An example of this in our world is selling another person into slavery. Another possible answer is that art is bartering with the space in order to own people. And the final one is art is exchanging something with people to own them. This last one is an individual selling themselves, like a job or even indentured servitude.

We now come to the final question, what is being exchanged? And with slightly more words: what is art exchanging with people, the unownables, and the space in order to own people in these various spaces? The answer to this question seems varied because it will depend on the parties involved in the exchange. Specifically, the exchange between art and the space, between art and the unownables, and between art and people will probably influence what is being exchanged.

If art is bartering with the unownables to own people, one possible example could be a museum curator purchasing art in order to own people for a brief amount of time - this is when museum goers go to view art pieces. Or in other words: the unownables buy art to buy people. This particular line of thinking also reminds me of advertisements... if advertisements can be considered an art, then there are unownables making advertisements in order to own people.

The next one is art bartering with people to own people. This means people are exchanging themselves with art. An example of this kind of exchange in the real world is an individual selling themselves into slavery or indentured servitude to help their family. An example of this in the art world could be interactive art, where the person somehow engages with the art, therefore giving themselves up to be used by the art piece.

The last type of exchange is between art and the space. This one I'm having a difficult time wrapping my mind around. The question is, what is art exchanging with the space in order to own people? If a space has some perceived value - for example, public spaces, private spaces, or some blend of the two - then it has something to exchange with the art. This perspective on spaces and art, two parties that are traditionally regarded as inanimate (lacking a will to take actions, make decisions, or do not have needs or wants) become much more alive. It seems that public spaces need people to do things that can only be done in public, otherwise the space is no longer public, and the public space will cease to exist - the public space's life is on the line. So having art in a public space means that art is exchanging something with the public space in order to attract people to that space. It is possible that there is no exchange going on between art and the space, and instead, they have a symbiotic relationship. They work together to continue existing.

Now to answer our original question: "art buys people" - what does it mean and is it possible? I still don't feel I have a grasp of what it means, but it might be possible, at least arguments can be made to make it seem possible.

This brief explication of 'art buys people' still leaves many unanswered questions. What is art doing with the people it owns? What is the artist's role and responsibility, if her art is capable of owning people? What does art want or need? And is this absurd?

For Argument's Sake by Daniel H. Cohen

As an analytic philosopher, I greatly appreciate this talk about argumentation because it communicates how our culture's norms have shifted towards the popular and worthless view of arguments. His rich definition of argumentation goes beyond the lay stereotype of screaming to make a point. I agree with Daniel Cohen's perspective that arguing is a form of learning - it's the loser of the argument that actually gains new knowledge, so the winner doesn't really gain anything from winning an argument. Watch the talk to learn more.

Art that Dies

During the panel discussion for the closing reception of >get >put at little berlin, the panelists circled around the idea of art that dies. This was in reference to the piece I contributed to the exhibition titled "Lo and Behold, I am become as a God." A question was posed, what will happen to my piece when all the sentences from the book Flatland have been recorded?

Technically, the software will catastrophically fail. It will throw a null pointer exception because the software contains an array of 1318 sentences. When that last sentence is finally recorded, the software I wrote will attempt to retrieve sentence 1319, but it won't be able to find it. Instead, the system will throw a null pointer exception. A null pointer exception is just a fancy way of saying that sentence 1319 doesn't exist.

"Lo and Behold, I am become as a God" has a lifespan, in some strange sense... It will exist for 1318 sentences, but it will then crash. The exact time frame for when the piece will die is not set in stone, but is determined by how many people interact with the piece. It's art that grows and matures based upon its interaction with people. This reminds me of the lifespan of a person and the proverb about the candle that burns brightest burns half as long... In other words, the more people that interact with the art, the quicker the retelling of Abbott's Flatland, the sooner the piece will stop functioning. All that will be left are the pieces of interaction "Lo and Behold, I am become as a God" has had with all the participants. It reminds me of a human life and the remnants of our interactions is one form of how we'll be remembered. In this case, the remnants of this piece will continue to exist on YouTube.

Simulating the Future of Political and Cultural Forces



Adam Kahane gives a great example of a nine day workshop he gave in the Republic of Columbia between conflicting political groups. He noticed that the same types of tensions and conflicts apparent in the larger country revealed themselves within the microcosm of the nine day workshop. As the workshop progressed, the conflicting sides co-created four different stories as scenarios that might unfold for the future. After sixteen years passed, Adam re-visited Columbia and met with an intellectual from the country. The intellectual pointed out that every one of those stories unfolded in a prophetic nature.

Adam's discussion and example of this group workshop he facilitated reminded me of the type of design that human centered designers are trained to do. This is the same type of facilitation performed by IDEO, the same type of design taught at the d.school at Stanford, and the same design I've learned at MiD at UArts. Part of what I find innovative about the curriculum at MiD is learning how to design and facilitate the experience of a group workshop. Designing group workshops requires a certain experience with human groups and being able to leverage how small and large groups work. These are based on psychological practices developed by Wilfred Bion and experienced through the Tavistock model. One key element about a group's life is that it parallels the life of an individual from birth to death, over the course of a workshop. This means that a group experiences anxiety, fear, tension, conflict, sadness, happiness, and complex emotional states that resemble an individual. As long as the individuals of the group are committed to staying a part of the group, the group will continue to grow. Growing as a group implies emotional maturity, just as individuals become emotionally mature with age. Each individual within the group brings past experiences, various cultures, and thought processes that determines the conflicts the group will face, which at times become representational of larger forces in the culture. For example, these forces can include racial differences, language barriers, gender differences, political differences, etc. Furthermore, these conflicts arise as the group is working towards a common task, which Bion calls the work task. I think this observable phenomenon about group life can be applied to make sense of what Adam Kahane is saying about the national tensions and conflicts reflecting in the microcosm of the nine day workshop.

Since these national tensions and conflicts reside in the individuals at the workshop, it seems that the group became a simulating environment for the different political forces. It's a simulation in the sense that we may  observe how the conflicting political forces may mature together - in another sense, they become as one individual, developing emotionally over time. Those political forces from sixteen years ago played out their growth over a period of nine days because that's how long the group had to mature. By the end of the workshop, the group had completed the task and had completed its developmental cycle. Those nine days simulated the future sixteen years.

Following this train of thought leads to applying facilitation workshops as a tool for simulating the future of organizations, nations, and the global political climate. The purpose would be to simulate an outcome in order to prepare for that outcome, whatever it may be. Preparing for outcomes by means of simulation is something humans naturally do. This is evidenced by the development of mathematical and physical models of the world. If facilitation workshops can be used as simulations of political and cultural forces, then humans should design facilitation workshops to predict certain outcomes for a melting pot of cultural and political forces.

Persuasive Technologies and the Spectrum of Responsibility: A Metaphysical Exploration of the Ethical Capacity of Computers



Introduction:
The following essay is in response to a dialogue I had with a professor of mine, Slavko Milekic. It was about software that influences people's behavior - known as persuasive technology. It's exploring a special case of software that continues to exist beyond the lifespan of its creators. Specifically, it's scratching the surface on the idea that certain software will continue to exist beyond the lifespan of its creators, and these creators will not be around to take responsibility for any negative repercussions caused by the software. The question this essay is exploring is whether it's possible for this type of software with long lifespans to be ethically responsible.

Essay Structure:
My discussion with Slavko began around BJ Fogg's argument, so that's where the essay begins. I've split the following essay into three parts. Part A explicates Fogg's argument, Part B begins to introduce the spectrum of responsibility and continues the explication, and Part C explores the concept of the spectrum of responsibility, which forms the basis of my objection to Fogg. For lack of time, I have not performed an adequate job in explaining the spectrum of responsibility because it relies heavily on ideas from Bertrand Russell, Paul Tillich, Baruch Spinoza, and John Locke. I've attempted to combine the ideas of sense-data, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, being, non-being, and labor and property into a tool that can be used to argue for a special case of stray persuasive technologies that should be considered as ethical agents. I've tried to use a mathematical metaphor to make better sense of the concept, but I am still uncertain if this is the case. The spectrum of responsibility is a tool that I will have to revisit once I have more time in order to fill in the argumentative jumps I've noticed while editing. Furthermore, I think it is possible to use it to prove the ethical agency of certain persuasive technologies independent of Luciano Floridi's information ethics and his idea of the infosphere. Finally, I will also need to allow for some time to pass between the writing of this essay and my revisiting in order to gather my thoughts about possible implications of the spectrum of responsibility for the ethical landscape.

Part A:
In Persuasive Technology, Fogg argues that computers can't take responsibility for an error, and therefore are not moral agents. In the paragraphs to come I will explore his two main assumptions that lead to his conclusion. I'll begin by covering a few foundational concepts and definitions that are key to understanding his argument. Then, I'll explain why he believes that “to be an ethical agent of persuasion,” the agent “must be able to take responsibility for [their] actions and at least partial responsibility for what happens to those whom [they] persuade” (Fogg, 218). Second, I will explain his assumption about a computer's lack of capacity to take responsibility in either the form of punishment or restitution. I will also present the logical steps one must take in order to come to his conclusion. Finding his second assumption objectionable for a special case of stray persuasive technologies, in part B I will explain how these persuasive technologies fit into the ethical picture.

Fogg is considering computers as interactive technologies, but more specifically, their use as persuasive technology. An interactive technology is an actor that can engage in a turn based exchange of information with other agents, including humans, animals, and other interactive technologies. Fogg is concerned about interactive technologies that are designed to persuade. He defines persuasion as “an attempt to change attitudes or behaviors or both (without using coercion or deception)” (Fogg, 15). Since Fogg's definition of persuasion includes “attempt,” the act of persuading does not have to succeed or fail. This implies that the individual agent persuaded changes their attitude or behavior voluntarily. Bringing the concept of persuasion together with interactive technology creates the realm of persuasive technology. These are interactive technologies that attempt to change attitudes, behaviors, or both of other agents.

Fogg uses a few terms that need to be clearly defined and discussed in relation to each other in order to understand his argument. These terms are ethical (moral) agent, ability, error, responsibility, persuasive entity, and restitution. Fogg uses ethical agent and moral agent interchangeably. Though it is possible to define an ethical agent in many different ways, I will be sticking to Fogg's definition. An ethical agent, Fogg defines, is an agent that has the ability to take responsibility for their actions. His definition brings together two important concepts about the agent: her ability and responsibility. Fogg is saying that the agent's ability to perform a certain action should be governed by her capacity to be responsible for that action. This is a normative claim that Fogg supports with an appeal to the moral codes of major civilizations. A moral code is a set of agreed upon rules by participants within a certain group. Since “making restitution for wrongdoings (or at least being appropriately punished) has been part of the moral code of all major civilizations,” then the wrongdoing of an ethical agent requires restitution or punishment (Fogg, 218).

Restitution is the process an ethical agent follows in order to return just value for a wrongdoing. A restitutive process is followed in order to restore a situation post-wrongdoing to a situation that will be equivalent to the situation pre-wrongdoing. Coming back to the capacity to be responsible for an action in Fogg's normative use, there are two ways that an ethical agent can be responsible. They may either provide restitution or be punished for a wrongdoing. If the ethical agent chooses to be punished or does not meet the requirements to provide restitution, then by an appropriate punishment the wrongdoing will be considered restored. An example in our current society is a criminal with no wealth. They have only their time and life that can be used as a kind of payment for a wrongdoing. Since the criminal has no wealth to provide restitution, appropriate prison time is put in place for this criminal.

Fogg mentions the responsibility for errors and seems to be using it synonymously with restitution or punishment for wrongdoings. For the context of this argument, error and wrongdoing are also used similarly. This means that they are both referring to actions that have to do with ethical consequences. The last term that needs to be defined is persuasive entity. Simply, it is an entity that can “advise, motivate, and badger” another entity. In this case, entity is the same as agent, but it does not connote ethical agent. A persuasive entity, Fogg makes clear, does not take responsibility. This means that if an agent is an ethical agent of persuasion, then they are a persuasive entity. However, if they are persuasive entity, they are not necessarily an ethical agent of persuasion.

Now that I've thoroughly beaten you over the head with these definitions, let me discuss some interesting argumentation on Fogg's behalf. Fogg states that an ethical agent of persuasion requires the agent to take responsibility for their actions and at least partial responsibility for what happens to those whom they persuade. Fogg is particularly concerned with persuasive actions and taking responsibility for when these actions detrimentally affect other agents. Furthermore, he stresses the case of computers working separately from humans. This is a case that will become more prominent as the internet continues to exist for an extended period and outlasts the companies that created interactive technologies in cyberspace. These stray interactive technologies that are also persuasive entities have the capacity to change an agent's attitudes, behaviors, or both.

If these stray persuasive technologies injure an individual in some form or another, Fogg believes they cannot take responsibility for this damage in the same way as a human being or a persuasive technology backed by designers and/or companies. This part of his argument relies on the belief that “computers themselves can't be punished or follow any paths to make restitution” the same way as a human being (Fogg, 218). Computers as persuasive entities, Fogg assumes, lack the capacity to take responsibility for an error or wrongdoing either by punishment or restitution. In order to make clear the capacity to take responsibility for an error, I think one needs to understand the source of that capacity. In other words, what provides a persuasive entity (computer or human) with the capacity to be responsible for a wrongdoing?

Part B:
It seems that there are two options for the source of the capacity to be responsible. One option is that the source is innate to the persuasive entity. An example of something innate to a persuasive entity is its being, its existence (For an in depth philosophic and historic explanation of being and non-being, please see The Courage to Be by Paul Tillich). The other option is something that is added onto the persuasive entity. An example of something that is added onto it is the world it organizes around itself, the rules the persuasive entity follows, or even the knowledge it acquires. I think these two options lay opposite of each other on the ends of a spectrum. An agent will fall somewhere along this spectrum of the source for the capacity of responsibility. An agent's source will be a mixture of these two ends and is unique to that agent but can change over time. Let's come back to the example of the criminal with no wealth. Imagine that this criminal now acquired some amount of wealth that can be used as restitution, but not enough to yield the full extent of the punishment. This criminal has shifted along the spectrum of responsibility.

It's of interest to note two parallels. One parallel is between 'the source of capacity being innate to the persuasive entity' and 'punishment'. The other parallel is between 'that which is added to the persuasive entity' and 'restitution'. Understanding the spectrum of responsibility from the lens of punishment and restitution means that an agent will fall on this spectrum somewhere between punishment and restitution. Again, note the example of the criminal with a varied amount of wealth. If the criminal has no wealth, he will fall to one side of the spectrum, pure punishment. This means that punishment in its purest form will affect the criminal's innate source for the capacity of responsibility. If the criminal has enough wealth to restore the full extent of the wrongdoing, then she will fall to the other side of the spectrum, pure restitution. Restitution in its purest form will affect the criminal's world that has been constructed mutually with the rest of society (I.e the criminal's wealth).

To further develop this tool, the spectrum of responsibility, and before we can understand the kinds of agents that can be quantified by this spectrum, I think it is necessary to fully understand this new tool that will aid in clarifying and showing why Fogg's argument superficially discarded persuasive entities from being ethical agents. The spectrum of responsibility is being developed specifically for the case of persuasive technology existing beyond the lifespan of the humans and companies that made them. My objection is special to this case and will be known as the special case of persuasive technology. A general objection that would include persuasive technology that exist within the lifespan of the humans and companies that have made them will not be argued in this paper.

Now let's begin the objection.

Part C:
The spectrum of responsibility can be visualized as an x-and-y coordinate system existing on the substrate of sense-data (See Figure 1). On the x-axis there is pure punishment reaching towards negative infinity and there is pure restitution reaching towards positive infinity. On the y-axis there is knowledge by acquaintance reaching towards negative infinity and knowledge by description reaching towards positive infinity. The following few paragraphs will explain sense-data, pure punishment, pure restitution, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, and how they all relate to each other in the spectrum of responsibility.

Sense-data, used similarly as Bertrand Russell, includes the “things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on” (Russell, 12). For the special case of persuasive technology, sense-data includes the data gathering that can be done by the persuasive technology. Senses need not be limited to the physical, but includes the digital. This means that the list of sensation examples can include 0's, 1's, and any combination there-of. However, this digital information requires non-biological senses to be perceivable, for example the laser lens in a DVD player. Another example of senses for technology are push buttons because it provides them sense-data of a sensation occurring at the location of the button.

The y-axis of the spectrum of responsibility is marked by knowledge by acquaintance reaching towards negative infinity and knowledge by description reaching towards positive infinity. Knowledge by acquaintance is the direct awareness of anything, “without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths” (Russell, 33). This is the most basic form of the awareness of knowledge because it does not require the use of inference to become aware of knowledge via a set of premises or truths. Knowledge by description, is more complex than knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by description uses truths or premises as its starting point and then requires some sort of rule or formula to be followed in order to become aware of the knowledge. The reason knowledge by acquaintance is set on the negative y-axis is because it is a less complex form of knowledge awareness, while knowledge by description is more complex and is signified as such by its location on the positive y-axis. For example, there is the pedometer that motivates the user to continue walking or running. This pedometer is aware via an accelerometer that it is moving. This is knowledge by acquaintance, and accordingly does not require inferences based on algorithms that require other truths to draw conclusions. However, the pedometer could be aware of knowledge by description of the users calories being burnt, assuming the pedometer also knows the runner's weight and certain biological markers. The calories burnt would be known via an inference. Let's say pedometer one could only detect motion, while pedometer two could also make inferences about calories burnt. This means that pedometer two would have a greater y-axis value than pedometer one, and in turn, a greater awareness of knowledge.

The x-axis of the spectrum of responsibility is marked by the two extremes of pure punishment and pure restitution. On the positive side of the x-axis lays pure restitution, whose extent is determined by Locke's notion of labor and property. I am referring to the State of Nature and the ability of the agent to remove things out of the State of Nature (Locke, 287, 288). Some thing is taken out of the State of Nature by the work that is done to it. Locke provides the acorn example, where by an individual gathers acorns that are freely available. By laboring and picking up the acorns, she has made them her own and she has right to it. For the special case of persuasive technology, I see Locke's notion of labor and property applying in the sense that unused cyberspace (i.e. the portion of hard drives that are unused) is by analogy in a State of Nature. The history logs that are accumulated by certain persuasive technologies is one possible example, such as a pedometer that motivates but also keeps track of all distances covered by the runner.

On the negative side of the x-axis lays pure punishment, whose extent is determined by the notion of being and non-being. Being is everything that is the agent. If the agent were to lose part of its being, then this loss is known as a privation of being, or the privation of a part of its being. For example, the blind man was once able to see with his eyes, but no longer can. This is known as the privation of sight. Non-being is the privation of being. Spinoza writes to Blyenbergh in Letter 21,

privation is nothing else than denying of a thing something, which we think belongs to its nature; negation is denying of a thing something, which we do not think belongs to its nature.” (Spinoza, 277)

This means that being contains non-being (Tillich, 34). To explain, death is inherent to all beings, so if life is denied, non-existence is the privation of everything that is the being. As it pertains to the special case of persuasive technology, it is sufficient to know that the existence of a persuasive technology can be denied.

Bringing these two axes together on top of the capacity of sense-data forms the spectrum of responsibility. If an agent does not have the capacity for sense-data, then they cannot be quantified for a wrongdoing by the spectrum of responsibility. The y-axis determines the awareness of the agent and the x-axis determines the form of responsibility that can be taken upon the agent dependent upon the awareness of the agent. Awareness in this sense refers to the agents ability to be aware of knowledge either by acquaintance or by description, where knowledge by description is more complex than knowledge by acquaintance.

Now revisiting Fogg's argument in light of the spectrum of responsibility, we can provide an objection to Fogg's assumption that “computers themselves can't be punished” for the special case of stray persuasive technologies (Fogg, 218). Fogg uses the word 'computers' to mean persuasive technology. As long as the persuasive technology has the ability, at the minimum, to acquire sense-data in order to be aware of knowledge by acquaintance, then the persuasive technology can take responsibility for a wrongdoing. Persuasive technology can take responsibility for a wrongdoing because their being can be appropriately punished or the information they have organized out of the state of nature can be taken away or deleted. Finally, incorporating Fogg's normative claim to the moral codes of major civilizations, if an agent can make restitution for wrongdoings (or at least be appropriately punished), then that agent should be considered an ethical agent. Since according to the spectrum of responsibility, certain persuasive technology can be punished, those that meet the requirements for sense-data and awareness of knowledge, then these persuasive technologies should be considered ethical agents.


References:





Positive Psychology

Martin Seligman discussing positive psychology and arguing for human flourishing by way of changing education, government, and our personal lives.



Explaining Design to Non-Designers

Yesterday's trends have empowered the individual to become connected with the tools to learn and solve just about anything they can question. Today's local and global communities are being pressed by tomorrow's problems. The issue of sustainability and the need for peaceful coexistence in a highly interconnected world is forcing individuals to re-imagine the communities they inhabit (Design Research for Sustainable Social Innovation by Ezio Manzini). This sets the stage for designers to engage with communities with multiple stakeholders. We, as designers, need to act as facilitators and teachers of design methodology to these individuals that are envisioning the social changes of tomorrow.

A step in the right direction is facilitating dialogue with non-designers. One possible form of charting their way into the design realm is to give them a road map while also acting as a guide. It would be futile, let alone morally problematic, to monopolize on design via a culture that excludes all others (Manzini, Action Research and the Practice of Design by Cal Swann). Visionary community members will attempt to become the facilitators for multiple stakeholders. Depending on their experiences with group dynamics, they will or will not approach the conflicts that arise with the correct framework. As opposed to managing conflict by pacifying it, one should accept it as a natural part of group life (Paradoxes of Group Life by Smith and Berg). A complex issue I've also been struggling to wrap my mind around.

These visionary community members may fail the first few times, and either they're going to get it right or they'll never try it again fearing future failures. I think designers should be present in the process to guide these individuals and their communities. In part, designers will be reminding these individuals of their available resources and help them think through problems. The end result will be far richer, both for the community and the designer. However, reminding the community of its resourcefulness requires the designer to clearly explain the design process to non-designers. I feel that this task has been surfacing for myself because I want to be able to succinctly articulate the role of a designer to anyone that asks.

I've had to confront explaining what I'm learning to my own community: explaining to friends and family the methodology I'm learning. I tell people I'm learning design, and their preconceptions of design history obfuscates where design is going. They assume I must be learning how to creatively design products for a consumer. I tell them that it's both true and false. I then go on to explain that design is not limited to products. It's a process that can be applied to find and solve problems, this process can include topics from ethnography and anthropology to the digital medium and politics. It leaves room for change, which I think is key to discovering complex and complicated problems and successfully innovating. In the initial phases of a design project, it can be tempting to settle with a single problem. Struggling with this temptation and remaining open to new information will allow one to see how other issues affect the problem that's being defined.

Problems can be interconnected, and several issues that seem unrelated at first could have the same root. Solving the root will result in a kind of domino effect where the problems connected to the root will also be solved, partially solved, or create a new context to understand the connected problems. Mapping problems out and attempting to draw connections between them will create a branching structure, much like a tree. These connections capture cause and effect relationships between problems. This causal tree is a map that can aid the designer in showing the community the relationship between problems. It is a way to begin chipping away at the community's complex situation.

Determining the causal relationships between each problem is a bit tricky because the designer will only have a hypothesis of how the problems are connected. Setting up some experiment is vital to determining the strength of connection between problems. For example, going into the community, the initial problem may be to solve the lack of safety for children at parks. Then, upon further exploration and interaction with the community, the designer may discover that the true problem is to confront the members of the community about their refusal to engage in constructive dialogue. The designer will then have to determine whether or not the latter problem is causally connected to the first problem. This is discovered through further interaction with the community, prototyping different solutions, and gauging the community's reaction.

My personal engagements with friends and family – non-designers – worry me that they don't see the value that's added in having an outsider within the community. A designer is an expert facilitator of information. Designers innately drive themselves to absorb as much information as possible and to understand the circumstance or challenge before them. Eventually returning this information to the community, restructuring it in new and compelling ways, will allow the community to look at itself from the outsider's perspective. The more self-aware a community is about its operations and activities, whether they're economic, political, organizational, etc, the better odds the community has at solving the problem and meeting the needs of all its members. Designer's don't necessarily solve the problem, they set the stage for the community to gain a better understanding of itself and its resources. Designers show the community opportunities. It is now the responsibility of the community to respect its members and create a solution that enriches everyone's life.

Fourth Order Design: The Underlying Structure of Communities and Moral Obligations of Designers

The design field is widening its scope as the world becomes smaller, tighter, and more complex. Designers need to be able to place themselves in the middle it all. Doing so, provides a vantage point to understand and make evident the invisible relationships present in the community. Depending on the context of these relationships, one will simply be rephrasing the same overall theme that is present in all communities. The community needs a responsible designer and the designer needs a responsive community. Otherwise, progress will not be based on an understanding that discovers subtle relationships.

from neuroscience and philosophy to design: some thoughts on thinking and solving

Design needs to leave its philosophical baggage at home, take a taxi to the airport, and fly to the far east. Our philosophical past, in reference to western philosophy is rooted in Descartes' dualism and his famous conclusion 'I think, therefore I am' (Meditations by Descartes). His conclusion was formed logically and consciously. This has created an adverse environment for proposing different ways of solving problems. We are stuck in the mindset that useful thinking only occurs on the conscious level.

The stories of great mathematicians, musicians, and philosophers that suddenly see the entire solution or composition in their mind’s eye as they walk to the coffee shop should have provided some clue as to the mind’s operations. People sometimes call this phenomenon intuition or a gut feeling. These misnamed terms incorrectly point to the emotions that appear to subjectively tilt people’s choices one way or another. They are pointing to the effect and not the cause. Intuition is the effect of subconscious processes and causes taking place just below our conscious mind (Mind time by Benjamin Libet). In the business and professional world, intuition is stigmatized and is a form of problem solving that is avoided. It is seen as illogical because the process is not explicit. On the contrary, human activity is implicit from day to day and realizing this will allow for a liberating design methodology.